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Abstract 
Recent turmoil in the financial markets following the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the credit crunch has 
repercussions in many other spheres of society. Governments have spent trillions of taxpayer dollars propping 
up the banking system in order to avoid systemic financial collapse. Significant public policy questions are being 
raised about the sustainability of the monetarist macroeconomic paradigm and the dogmatic neoliberal faith in 
financial deregulation. Media discourses have included open criticism of the finance sector. However, the right of 
private banks to create money through the issuance of credit and the generation of fictitious values through the 
securitisation of anticipated future revenue remain peripheral to policy debate, even though they lie at the heart 
of the recent crises. 
Although Marx provided the seminal critique of capitalism’s internal contradictions, his work on credit-money and 
financial accumulation processes were never fully developed. However, the more recent work of Hyman Minsky 
emphasises the role of credit systems in financial markets’ endogenous tendency toward crisis.  
This paper proposes to extend a Marxist critique of contemporary financial crises using Minksy’s financial 
instability hypothesis. However, this requires emphasis on the reflexive communicative processes underpinning 
credit-money and fictitious financial values. In doing so, it will highlight the role of media and communication 
systems in accumulation regimes and the risks posed to the lifeworld as financial processes become 
increasingly self-referential and autopoietic.  
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Preliminary note  
 This paper is based on extracts from the author’s doctoral thesis
1
 which examines the political economy of 
communication in global financial markets with a particular focus on how institutional investors prioritise different 
forms of media and information sources. Theoretically, the work draws on a range of social theory to weld 
together insights from political economic and cultural economic into a communication-based account of financial 
                                                 
1
 This was undertaken through RMIT University, Melbourne. The broad aims of the thesis were to: 
 Develop an analytic framework that can be used to conceptualise and explain financial market phenomena in terms of 
communicative/informational processes and allow relevant theories and concepts from different sub-fields to be 
integrated.  
 Provide an empirical description of media/information source prioritisation by institutional traders/analysts in making 
investment decisions across four major financial market areas (stocks/equities, bonds/ interest rate securities, 
currencies/forex, and derivatives).  
 Measure and correlate trader/analyst meta-knowledge about media/information used in investment decisions; i.e. 
perceptions of the relative perceived importance and objectivity of media/ information sources and also the relative 
perceived importance of different types of information used in investment decisions. 
 Identify convergences and divergences in perceptions of media importance and objectivity across different sectors of 
financial market trading.  
 Assess the implications of the findings for theories positing a reflexive/constitutive relation between financial information 
and market reality. 
 Assess the extent to which the findings generally support or confirm claims that financial markets have become more 
publicly accessible/ democratically accountable or become increasingly autopoietic/ decoupled from other spheres of 
society.  
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transactions and generation (or annihilation) of financial values. These arguments are necessarily abbreviated in 
this paper. The empirical study included a survey and a series of interviews with New Zealand-based traders and 
analysts and also periods of non-participant observation on the trading floors of Deutsche Bank, ANZ bank and 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Again, space precludes presentation of the empirical data and analysis in 
detail, but the findings inform the arguments concerning the extent to which financial markets exhibit 
communicative reflexivity and respond to information/signals endogenously generated by the activities of 
financial markets themselves. The conceptions of communicative reflexivity are deployed to analyse the 
processes through which fictitious financial values are generated and annihilated (linking a neo-Marxist account 
of capital accumulation to Minksy’s account of financial instability) and also to conceptualise the financial 
system’s autopoietic tendency to become decoupled from the industrial economy and lifeworld, as recently 
illustrated by the global credit crunch.  
 
 
The context of contemporary financial markets 
 
Money may make the world go round, but the global communications infrastructure and financial information 
systems are what allow money to go round the world. The convergence of computing, telecommunications and 
other electronic media since the 1970s, in conjunction with financial deregulation, has led to important shifts both 
in the scale and nature of international financial markets.  
 
The total value of world financial assets increased from approximately US$12 trillion in 1980 to US$167 trillion by 
2006 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2006, 2008). Of that US$ 167 trillion, US$54 trillion is represented by equities 
(company stocks), US$45 trillion by bank deposits (monetary holdings), US$43 trillion by private debt securities 
(mostly corporate bonds), and US$26 trillion by government debt securities (treasury bonds). On top of this, by 
2006, the global derivatives market was worth a further US$10 trillion in gross market value, and US$477 trillion 
in notional value
2
 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2008; Bank of International Settlements, 2007a).  By way of 
contrast, industrial market production, represented by World GDP, was a ‘mere’ US$48 trillion in 2006 (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2008). 
 
Meanwhile, exponential increases in information processing capacity and the volume, velocity and extension of 
electronic financial transactions have seen the daily global market turnover of foreign exchange (forex or FX) 
derivatives expand from US$880 billion in 1989 to US$3.21 trillion in 2007 (Bank of International Settlements, 
2005, 2007a). While forex markets generate the largest turnovers (see table below), other areas of the global 
financial markets also generate massive trading volumes.  In 2006, US$280 billion was traded daily in equities 
(GoForex, 2007) while US$947.3 billion was traded in government bonds (SIFMA, 2007). Meanwhile, in 2007, 
the overall daily turnover in global OTC derivatives
3
 markets was US$4.2 trillion (BIS, 2007b, 2007c).  
 
Average Daily Turnover on Global Foreign Exchange Markets (US$ billions) 
Instrument 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Spot transactions 317 394 494 568 386 621 1005 
Forwards 27 58 97 128 130 208 362 
Swaps 190 324 546 734 656 944 1714 
Estimated gap in reports 56 43 53 61 28 107 129 
Total ‘traditional’ turnover: 590 820 1190 1490 1200 1880 3210 
Total Forex turnover  650 880 1150 1650 1420 1950 3210 
   Figures derived  from Bank of International Settlements (BIS), (2005, 2007a) 
 
These colossal flows are comprised predominantly of speculative investment capital controlled primarily by 
institutional investors working for investment banks
4
, pension funds, insurance brokerages, hedge funds and 
                                                 
2
 Derivatives are contracts whose value to the buyer or seller changes according to the price movement of another 
underlying asset within a specified time frame. On the most basic level, a  simple futures or options derivative might entail an 
agreement to buy/ sell a commodity or other security at some price agreed today, thereby protecting the contract holder 
against the risk of unforeseen price movements. The cost of the derivatives contract is only a fraction of the capital value of 
the underlying asset in question, hence the ‘notional’ value is much higher than the market value of the capital exchanged 
between the counterparties. See later discussion for more information about how derivatives markets operate.  
3
 Over-the-counter or OTC derivatives are private financial contracts between two counterparties, sometimes of a bespoke 
nature. Exchange derivatives are generic contracts which are standardised and routinely traded through exchanges or as 
securities in their own right, e.g. commodities or FX futures.  The US$4.2 trillion is in notional value, not gross market value. 
4
 Note that some definitions of ‘institutional investor’ exclude banks, but the term here is used inclusively to refer to 
professional investors working for large financial organisations. In contrast, the term ‘individual investor’ refers to a private 
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other investment firms and brokerage houses (although transnational corporations are also significant financial 
actors and there is growing participation from individual investors). Global capital flows are an index of the 
essential agency of capitalism, i.e. to constantly seek new configurations of investment to maximise returns. 
Global financial markets operate around the clock (although major exchanges have set opening hours during the 
week) as do most major financial institutions (with trading desks in different parts of the globe opening as others 
close). Trading desks are packed with screen displaying real-time market updates. News from one major 
financial centre can generate real-time reactions in stock, bond and foreign exchange markets across the world 
(Anderson et al., 2007).  
 
The expansion of the scale of financial market trading has entailed not only unprecedented increases in the 
basic volume of monetary flows but also unprecedented increases in financial market activity as a proportion of 
global economic production (Wade, 2006; Pazarbasioglu et al., 2007; McKinsey Global Institute, 2008).  The 
total value of global financial securities was roughly equivalent to world GDP in 1980 (109%) but by 2006, this 
ratio had increased to 348% (US$167 trillion in financial market capitalisation compared with US$48 trillion in 
world GDP). Many of the advanced industrial economies now have a financial ‘depth’ of over 400% GDP 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2006, 2008). This has significant implications not only for the relations between 
financial markets and  industry, government and civil society, but also for capitalism itself.  
 
This expansion and extension of global financial market activity and increasing financial deepening has been 
facilitated by the development of communication and computing infrastructures through which flows of market 
information and capital itself are mediated. Communication infrastructures link trading desks around the world to 
major exchanges and specialised financial media systems such as Reuters and Thomson-Bloomberg which not 
only  provide financial actors with real-time information but also with the interface through which most investment 
transactions are undertaken.  
 
 
The context of global finance and communication systems 
 
The expansion of the financial markets since the 1970s is closely related to the development of new 
communication systems and information technologies deployed in financial markets. New communication/ 
information technologies (NCTs) have been central to a number of significant developments in financial markets 
since the 1970s.  NCTs have facilitated substantial increases in the velocity, volume and extension of financial 
market activity through providing the infrastructure for transborder capital and market information flows.  They 
also play a role in bringing about spatial-temporal reconfigurations of the networks of interaction interconnecting 
the key spaces/nodes in which financial decisions/ investment transactions take place. Physical exchanges and 
pit trading have been gradually superseded by electronic brokerage systems and a global network of trading 
rooms interlinked through trading screens. 
  
Meanwhile, the emergence of new financial models, new financial investment instruments and assets (NFIs) and 
new modalities of trading (such as the use of derivatives for leverage and to hedge risk) are also dependent on 
NCTs. The calculation (and securitization) of financial risk and the interlinkage between different financial 
securities across formerly spatially/ temporally discrete markets depends on systems of calculation and 
information processing that were in most cases not feasible prior to the development of computers and digital 
media. The potential for accelerating and amplifying returns on the financial accumulation circuits is a key driver 
of financial deepening both in terms of the ratio of financial market activity/values to the industrial economy (see 
earlier statistics) and the increasing proportion of financial sector revenue in company profits.   
 
The expansion and acceleration of financial information production/ dissemination systems, (both public media 
such as CNBC, and specialist/ institutional media such as high-end wire services and electronic brokerage 
platforms such as Bloomberg and Thomson-Reuters) simultaneously facilitate and intensify the demand for real-
time market monitoring across an increasing range of financial variables (reflecting new financial models and 
modes of trading). As information flows accelerate, so too do trading responses, increasing the rate at which 
prices change (volatility). The symmetrical and simultaneous distribution of market information compresses the 
time-frames in which trading decisions are undertaken and tightens price-spreads between markets and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
person who actively and routinely engages in financial investment activity for personal gain, and includes ‘day traders’, the 
semi-professional investors who engage in securities trading through electronic exchanges, buying and selling on a daily 
basis to seek profits from short term price fluctuations. The term ‘individual investor’ as used here generally excludes 
members of the general public who have financial assets managed on their behalf (e.g. in a pension fund) or who passively 
hold financial securities such as stocks or bonds for the purpose of gaining dividends, but who do not trade these on any 
regular basis.  
 4 
securities, largely eliminating arbitrage opportunities derived from informational symmetry (Carey, 1995). In 
trading rooms packed with trading screens and awash in real-time flows of data, filtering and prioritisation is 
unavoidable. In turn this increases the importance of monitoring other financial actors to discern what variables 
and trading models/frames are currently driving capital flows. This meta-information is critical in maintaining a 
trading edge in an informationally symmetrical market. However, trading based on this kind of reflexive 
knowledge has the potential to become self-referential and decoupled from core fundamentals (such as 
company earnings, interest rates, and growth in the industrial economy).  
 
Meanwhile, the pressure to respond in real-time to changes in information and prices intensifies volatility and 
decreases the predictability of markets (see Hope, 2006). This opens up new trading opportunities using NFIs to 
performatively calculate, securitize and exchange financial risk, but also increases the complexity, opacity, 
leverage and interlinkage of financial securities (particularly where OTC derivatives are traded between private 
counterparties). While these new modes of trading may sustain returns on investment and allow the hedging of 
some risks, the systemic effect can be to increase the potential for breakdowns in the models and reference 
points that allow risk and (fictitious) financial values to be calculated (Bryan & Rafferty, 2006).  
 
The conjunction of symmetries of information, globally networked nodes of trading operating around the clock 
and systems of calculation that  increases the risk of symmetries of meaning and agency. This may not only 
precipitate crisis but increase the risk of fictitious value annihilation in one market/security type being manifested 
across others.  Transparency regimes intended to control financial risks, moderate volatility (due to market 
shocks) and increase efficiency (both informational and in terms of returns on investment over time) may 
increase information disclosure and hence symmetry of price sensitive information (Best, 2005). However, this 
can also have the effect of further tightening price spreads and necessitating trading strategies (such as 
increased leverage and complex securities) that engender more/different forms of risk in order to sustain returns. 
This  further narrows the opportunities for arbitrage and the margins on returns and increases the use of 
leveraged trading NFIs to amplify profits. Importantly, it also requires new investment strategies and trading 
models underpinned by communication systems. 
 
Theorising communication and finance 
 
The changes in financial markets related to new media and information systems are not merely technological in 
nature. They also involve significant shifts in the implicit conceptions of the nature of capital and the criteria that 
shape value. The nature of capital as a social relation was recognised by Marx (1859, 1885, 1894). However, 
The neo-Marxist foregrounding of social macrostructures does not lend itself readily to meaning-based accounts 
of symbolic exchange and the formation of the shared conceptual/interpretative systems underpinning financial 
values. Simmel (1900/1990), meanwhile, theorised monetary forms in terms of enculturated trust in symbolic 
forms. However, accounting for the cultural-symbolic processes underpinning contemporary financial exchange 
while maintaining a focus on the critical political economic implications of such developments is not simple. The 
symbolic ontology of contemporary finance is more easily analysed from a cultural economic perspective. 
However, the cultural economic emphasis on micro-level agency and ethnographic description can occlude the 
macro-level political-economic implications of these processes. Analysing contemporary financial markets 
therefore requires an integration of the insights from both political economy and cultural economy.  
 
Several approaches in social theory have attempted to bridge or circumvent the tension between structural and 
agency-based accounts of social activity, including Giddens’ (1979, 1984) structuration theory, Bourdieu’s (1977; 
1993) field/habitus framework, and actor-network theory (see Latour, 1993; Callon, 1999;). Although none of 
these had escaped criticisms of dualism, instrumentalism or determinism (sometimes all of these from different 
critics) the general recognition that social action required some form of coordination and mediation between 
agents and that actions would help reproduce structures is an important commonality. Another recent approach 
is cultural political economy, which includes the works of Sayer (2001), Jessop (2004) and Graham (2006). 
These all recognise the utility of emphasising symbolic/communicative processes in synthesising political 
economic and cultural economic analyses (Sayer emphasises Habermasian communicative action, Jessop 
emphasises intersubjectivity and semiosis, and Graham emphasises discourses and sociolinguistics). These all 
offer significant insights into the constitutive role of symbolic/communicative processes in  economic/financial 
reality. However, all have limitations related to conceptions of systemic (dis)embedding (Sayer), the materiality of 
semiosis (Jessop) or the (over)emphasis on linguistic processes in economic activity (Graham). While accepting 
that all these approaches offer theoretically progressive insights, it was deemed necessary to develop a bespoke 
framework which would foreground symbolic/ communication processes and allow political economic and 
cultural economic analyses of financial phenomena to be transcoded (see Jameson, 1997).  
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The formulation of intersubjective codification borrows from the aforementioned approaches in conceiving of 
structure and action as mutually constitutive formations which demarcate the available channels and modalities 
of meaningful action within a given arena. The notion of intersubjectivity here emphasises the necessity of 
individual agents’ mutual recognition of the channels/modes of action in order to coordinate economic exchange 
and the coherent ascribing of meanings to transactions. Thus, for example, for money to be used in purchases, 
transactors must agree on what counts as legitimate tender and commodity forms, recognise property rights and 
agree on valuations. This approach obviates the need to posit ontologically distinct social structures that function 
independently of social agents by recognising that the codifications operating within a given social arena both 
mediate and constrain action. Aggregates of social action condition the arenas in which individual agency 
operates, but it is those actions through which intersubjective codifications are reproduced (and renegotiated) 
over time. The formulation does not deny the objective ontology of the material world, but conceives the relations 
of economic agents to that material world (e.g. property rights or valuations) as  constructed, mediated and 
reproduced through communication processes. 
 
In this regard, the processes of financial communication and mediation cannot be adequately understood as 
simply representative of external/ objective market events. Rather, they are  reflexively constitutive of financial 
reality. Thompson (2003, 2009) identifies three basic forms of communicative reflexivity:  
 
 The implicit/performative form concerns the need for mutual recognition of monetary forms, instruments, 
models and channels in order to facilitate meaningful transactions, and it is on this level that financial theory 
can be defined/performed into reality (including calculative processes of valuation, specification of 
fundamentals and trading frames/schemata and reification of complex new securities as tradable objects).  
 The explicit/transactional form of reflexivity primarily involves the crystallization of prices through 
buying/selling (or enunciation of ask-bids on brokerage screens), and also the generation of price 
movements through high volume transactions that exceed current liquidity levels (note this also creates 
fictitious market values/returns by indexical extension of the ostensible value of recently-traded securities to 
all the other holdings of those securities). Other communicative market actions involving the deployment of 
specific symbolic forms (such as credit ratings or interest rates) are themselves intersubjectively coded as 
core fundamentals and thus directly constitute shifts in market reality. These can also be considered to entail 
explicit/transactional reflexivity. 
 The contingent/game form of reflexivity involves extensions of trading schemata/frames to include the 
monitoring of other market actors’ opinions/ motives/ positions and basing one’s own investments not only 
on the market information available but on the anticipation of how other market actors will collectively 
interpret and respond to it. This includes self-referential Importantly, this latter process also allows 
renegotiations of the intersubjective codifications by redefining new variables a variables that need 
monitoring and transforming trading models/frames/schemata.  
 
 
Globalisation and financial accumulation 
 
There several accounts of globalisation that offer relevant accounts of finance (including Held et al, 1999; 
Appadurai, 1990; Castells, 1996; Sklair, 2001 and Sassen, 1996, 2006). These cannot be reviewed here, but a 
general argument can be made that globalisation can be broadly conceived in terms of a reconfiguration of the 
delineations and relations among the polity, economy and civic/lifeworld subsystems. Financial globalisation has 
been facilitated and accommodated by important adjustments in the relations among the institutions of state, 
capital and civil society (see Held, et al., 1999). This partly reflects an important shift in macroeconomic policy 
from the 1970s onwards away from the Keynesian paradigm toward the neoliberal/ monetarist paradigm. The 
former framework allowed governments autonomy over domestic borrowing and expenditure while using controls 
on currency pegs and restrictions on capital flows to maintain economic stability. In contrast, the 
neoliberal/monetarist framework regards free capital flows and currency stability as essential to market efficiency 
and therefore requires domestic spending and full employment goals to be subordinated to these fiscal priorities 
(Obstfeld, et al, 2003; Best, 2005).  
 
From the late 1970s onwards, the Atlantic-Fordist mode of capital accumulation underwent an important shift 
(Jessop’s, 1990, 2001a). Accumulation based on returns on investment in industrial production was eroded as 
the spatial and temporal inertia of commodity production/ consumption in inflationary environments led to 
diminishing returns. Meanwhile, the opportunities for accumulation offered by financial market investment were 
expanding and massive amounts of capital began to gravitate towards the financial system (Jessop, 1990; 
Sweezy, 1997; Harvey, 1999; Bellamy Foster, 2008). By 1980, the scale of global financial markets had begun 
to exceed world GDP. This shift in the primary mode of accumulation towards ‘financialization’ (Sweezy, 1997) 
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was facilitated by the new modes of trading made possible by new communication technologies (NCTs) and new 
financial instruments (NFIs). along with the relaxation of controls on international capital flows.  
 
These shifts in the primary mode of accumulation can still be usefully informed by Marx’s (1867, 1885, 1894) 
seminal critique of capitalism, particularly the internal contradictions that manifest in the industrial and financial 
accumulation circuits (M-C-M’ and M-M’ respectively). Hilferding (1910) develops this analysis, particularly in 
regard to the importance of bank-credit. The work of Harvey (1990, 1999, 2003) is likewise significant in 
explaining how capital accumulation regimes have been underpinned by a series of temporal-spatial ‘fixes’ which 
temporarily off-set the tendency for accumulation and crisis. The perpetual drive to realise surplus value and 
avoid diminishing returns/ overaccumulation helps explain the drive to extend capital investments across space 
(seeking cheap labour/resources and cultivating new consumer markets) while compressing the temporal lags 
between investment and returns (using technology to increase efficiency in production/distribution and capital 
allocation through provision of market information). However, the argument here is that the nature of the 
contradictions and the propensity of capitalist markets toward crisis cannot be fully explained without 
consideration of the symbolic nature of fictitious value. Marx’s labour theory of value does not sit comfortably 
with this, although his well-known observation  in Capital Volume 3, (1894: chapter 29) suggests he anticipated 
precisely the form of financial securitisation that underpinned the recent credit crunch: ‘Interest-bearing capital, in 
general, is the fountainhead of all manner of insane forms, so that debts, for instance, can appear to the banker 
as commodities’.  
 
The problem of exponential growth of financial values out of proportion to the industrial economy was explicitly 
recognised by former Federal Reserve head Alan Greenspan (1996) in his ‘irrational exuberance’ speech. The 
generation of fictitious values that ostensibly sustain accumulation without commensurate increases in goods or 
services with use-value points to another type of symbolic accumulation ‘fix’
5
 on the M-M’ circuit based on 
communicative ontology of monetary forms and generation of fictitious values related to communicative 
reflexivity. Indeed, this can be regarded as an extension of the role of media and communication systems in the 
different forms of spatial-temporal fix that Harvey discusses (see typology in the appendix).  
 
Jessop’s (2004) work on cultural political economy recognises the potential importance of incorporating an 
account of semiosis into accounts of global capitalism. Graham’s (2006) analysis of ‘hypercapitalism’ likewise 
recognises the role of media/information technologies and language/discourse in the formation of fictitious 
values. However, these do not specifically address the role of communication and mediation processes  in the 
specific context of accumulation fixes or crises. The framework of intersubjective codification and communicative 
reflexivity offers a way of extending these analyses in this direction, but to demonstrate this, there is a need to 
examine communication processes in relation to money. 
 
 
Communication and monetary forms 
 
Dodd (1994) and Gilbert (2005) both point out that the definitions of money are contested and identify a 
theoretical tension between the structural political-economic analysis of monetary systems on a broad social 
level, and the ethnographic/ micro-social analysis of the manifold forms of monetary practices in specific socio-
cultural contexts. One important seminal socio-cultural theorisation was developed by Simmel (1900/1990) who 
emphasised that money required a fiduciary network of institutionalised trust among market actors who mutually 
recognise its value and validity as payment. Simmel also emphasised the way money had became a generic 
form of social power and noted the potential for social relations to become depersonalised through monetary 
relations. Other ethnographic approaches to money have emphasised how the uses of money are inscribed with 
social rules for legitimate usage in different socio-cultural contexts, i.e. ‘earmarking’ (see Zelizer, 1994; Singh, 
2001).  
 
A limitation of emphasising money’s potential for generic social action and capacity to be earmarked to serve the 
agency of the holder is that it risks underestimating the structural limitations of monetary forms and understating 
the significance of the institutional origins of money in capitalist society; i.e. securitised bank credit/debt issued 
                                                 
5
 Note that there is a distinction here between the symbolic fix involving fictitious value on the M-M’s circuit and the 
arguments  of  Bell (1973) and  Castells (1996) concerning informational goods, Baudrillard’s notion of sign-value (1993) and 
Lash & Urry’s (1994) discussion of the symbolic economy, all of which are concerned primarily the commodity exchange 
circuit (M-C-M’).  
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through fractional reserve banking
6
 as interest-bearing capital on the M-M’ circuit (see Rowbotham, 1999). This 
is essentially a process involving the securitisation of a promise of future payment by semiotically inscribing the 
expected value of that future payment into present frames of reference. So long as the transactors have 
confidence that a) the promised payment will be made and b) the denominated form it  is made in will retain its 
purchasing power among other market actors, then the promise itself really is as good as gold, so to speak. 
Indeed, the origin of money as a fictitious form of capital in the circuit of accumulation underscores how deeply 
the financial system underpins the industrial economy and other subsystems which make use of money. 
Although money can indeed be used in manifold ways, on a systemic level, credit-money is always vectored 
back to the private banking sector from which it originated, and in the final instance, this will inflect its usage
7
.  
 
This would seem to invite a neo-Marxist analysis but as noted earlier, Marx conceived of money as a commodity 
form and regarded fictitious values on the M-M’ circuit as inconsistent with the labour theory of value. Several 
theorists have attempted to resolve this issue: Ganssman (1988) and Goux (1990) both argue that the labour 
theory of value must be discarded. Meanwhile Kennedy (2000) and Fine and Lapavitsas (2000) respectively 
attempt to reconceptualise money in terms of abstract labour value and specialised commodity forms. The 
argument concurs with the former two theorists that the labour theory of value must be superseded in order to 
account for its symbolic ontology. However, in contrast to Goux and Ganssman, this is not necessitated by 
contemporary shifts in the symbolic ontology of capital; rather, Marx’s labour value and commodity-based 
conception of money never adequately accounted for the shared codes underpinning money’s fiduciary origins. 
On that point, Goux’s psychoanalytic approach leads him to assert the need for shared social meaning in 
monetary forms but reject intersubjectivity as a basis for theorising this. Ganssman, meanwhile, recognises the 
symbolic/codified form of money, but correctly argues (contra Graham, 2006) that language is an inadequate 
basis to understand monetary codes. He also rejects Luhmann’s (1984) account of money as a communicative 
system, suggesting that this overstates indeterminate agency and fails to account for its role in the maintenance 
of structural power relations in society. However, this assumes (rather like Jessop’s [2004] reservations about a 
semiotic account of economic structure) that communication/ symbolic processes are referential rather than 
constitutive and cannot provide an account of structurally delimited behaviour.  
 
The intersubjective codification framework resolves precisely such objections by emphasising how the 
demarcation of legitimate channels and modalities of action simultaneously embody and constrain monetary 
agency. In this regard Zelizer’s (1994) notion of earmarking applies, but in the context of institutionally 
demarcated channels (which is why the even the traders responsible for the trillions of dollars’-worth of daily 
capital flows are constrained by the options on the brokerage screens and their institutional parameters of risk-
tolerance). In conceiving of money as abstract purchasing power, the framework also allows Simmel’s emphasis 
on institutionalised networks of trust and generic social power (within the parameters of the available institutional 
channels) to be transcoded. The framework also helps explain how the deployment of  monetary symbols within 
a network of market agents whose codifications recognise them as money (implicit/performative reflexivity) 
constitutes a shift in social relations (e.g. property rights or the transfer of liabilities) and crystallizes market 
prices (explicit/transactional reflexivity), also sending a signal to other market actors about changes in valuation/ 
market expectations (contingent/game reflexivity). This then serves to link the conception of money and financial 
action into an account of reflexivity in financial markets and the generation of fictitious values that underpin the 
‘symbolic fix’ to accumulation. 
 
Fictitious values, symbolic fixes and crisis 
 
The credit/debt-based origins of monetary form in capitalist economies and the determination of their buying 
power through exchange on the global forex markets presupposes intersubjective recognition of their form, 
function and value to enable the coordination of financial activities and the mutual recognition of financial values. 
The private creation of money through fractional reserve banking is possible because of the indiscernibility of 
any distinction between the issued monetary simulacra and the reserve, performatively making an electronic 
                                                 
6
 Through FRB, private banks are able to issue credit on a scale far greater than their actual currency reserves (a ratio of 
around 10:1 is common). States are responsible for the issuance of physical currencies (M0) and reserve banks usually set 
default interest rates. However, this is a small fraction of the overall  money supply. Insofar as the banking (and, since 
financial liberalisation, shadow-banking) system operate as private businesses, the control of the monetary system is 
essentially controlled by financial corporations.  
 
7
 In the sense that borrowed money is issued with the obligation to repay, meaning it cannot simply be expended as payment 
for use-value commodities if this precludes possibility of repayment. Hence businesses borrow money to invest on the 
expectation that the investment will generate returns from which the interest can be repaid. Consumers who use credit for 
consumption soon find that increasing proportions of their disposable income are demanded by the bank. 
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credit dollar just as functionally ‘real’ as a physical dollar coin/bill (see Baudrillard, 1975, 1981; Rotman, 1980). 
The contracted expectation of future repayment allows the issuance of the credit symbol to the borrower who 
can then use it in market transactions. As Rowbotham (1999) points out, so long as the bank creditors maintain 
their confidence that their money is redeemable on request, the bank can continue to issue credit far in excess 
of its actual reserves.  The notional/fictitious value of financial securities is generated in an analogous fashion. 
Financial securities are priced on the basis of the expectation of the future revenue they will generate for the 
owner (Golding, 2003). However, the incorporation of future expectations into current prices necessarily involves 
processes of calculation and mediation of information about the market (or other investors). This is a key reason 
why shifts in investor perceptions, the frames/schemata used to inform trading decisions or new information 
indicating a need to modify expectations will trigger trading and move prices.  
 
As previously explained, trading in a volume that exceeds the current level of liquidity will move prices in the 
direction needed to attract the buyer/seller. As Golding (2003) and Muniesa (2007) point out, trading even a 
small proportion of the total shares of a particular company type can affect the notional value of all the company 
shares
8
. The trading generates a constitutive symbolic commensuration between the listed price and fictitious 
capital value. The notional price of a financial asset is fictitious precisely because it is based on current market 
expectations of the value of the future returns and the surplus that can be realised if the asset is liquidated
9
. In 
the same way, the mortgage debt underpinning the collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) implicated in the 
credit crunch was securitised and valued based on the expected revenue streams (including, as it turned out, 
erroneous indications of the risk of non-repayment). In the case of derivatives futures, the future valuation of the 
underlying asset can be performatively inscribed into present frames of reference.  
 
As Bryan & Rafferty (2006) suggest, derivatives bind the financial future to the present (also see Pryke & Allen, 
2000; Best, 2005). This can be conceptualised partly as contractual obligation, but the trading of futures contract 
on exchanges also provides an important signal about future expectations which can feed back into market 
expectations and hence the prices of underlying assets they denote
10
. An important process underpinning such 
calculations involves the quantification, securitization and transfer of financial risk. Although this takes historical 
price volatility (price movement over time) into account, it also involves calculations of risk which are 
performatively built into present prices. Prices are therefore sensitive to shifts in the perception of risk, and 
consequently, so too are fictitious values. Indeed, in regard to securitised debt, whether mortgage securities or 
government bonds, the ratings agencies (notably Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) play a key role in 
issuing investment grades which guide investment decisions and have a potentially significant effect on 
valuations
11
 (see Kunczik, 2002). 
 
These are the basic  mechanisms of the symbolic fix to accumulation. However, it is simultaneously the 
mechanism that predisposes the financial system toward crisis, because the  fictitious value that crystallizes in 
the semantic matrix of investor calculations and expectations can be annihilated in exactly the same manner and 
with a disproportionately small volume of trading.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Thus if buying 100 shares of a public company with 10,000 shares on the market pushes the price of a share up a dollar, 
then within the semantic matrix mediated by globally interlinked trading screens, the fictitious value of the company increases 
by $10,000, not $100 (albeit possibly only temporarily). 
 
9 Of course, if all the stock holders collectively tried to cash in on a sudden increase in an asset’s notional value then their 
aggregate attempts to sell the assets might exceed the level of market liquidity (i.e. willing buyers at the current price) and 
collapse the asset’s fictitious value. 
10
 Other interviews noted that trade in derivatives would often affect prices in the underlying securities, not so much because 
of self-fulfilling expectations, but because the counterparties exposed to the risk of price movements if they were ‘short’ 
would buy the asset in question to hedge their position. This might still move the price, but it stems from institutional 
decisions about risk and portfolio structure, not self-fulfilling prophecy in any simple sense.  
 
11
 Many financial institutions have a specified risk threshold under which securities cannot be bought and/or must be sold. 
BBB is the common investment-grade threshold, although some institutions will be more or less risk tolerant.  
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Fictitious value and Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
 
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis
12
 (1977, 1982, 1992, see also Bellofiore & Ferri, 2001) identifies the 
central role of money and credit in financial pricing systems and links these to financial market’s endogenous 
propensity toward financial bubbles/ crises. Importantly, as Keen (2001) and Pineault (2001) both observe, 
Minsky’s recognition of the intrinsic instability of financial accumulation is also suggestive of its potential for it to 
be transcoded into a neo-Marxist account of accumulation crises (although this requires that the labour theory of 
value does not apply to the M-M’ circuit). Minsky (1977) differentiated between two systems of pricing in the 
economy, which as Keen (2001) suggests, identifies a disjuncture between Marx’s circuits of commodity 
production and financial exchange:  
 
‘The money wage rate is a dominant determinant of the supply price of investment output [i.e. 
commodity production]. The price of a capital asset is a determinant of the demand price of a 
comparable investment good. Given that the price level of capital assets [i.e. M-M’] and investment 
output [i.e. M-C-M’] are based upon quite different principles, it is not surprising that, at times, they 
can and do get out of ‘alignment’. This is especially so when […] positions in capital assets as well 
as the investment output in the process of being produced are debt financed, so that changing in 
financing terms affect both the supply price of investment outputs with significant gestation periods 
as well as the market value of capital assets.’ (Minksy, 1977, p.142). 
 
As Hummel (2002) notes, Minsky’s analysis highlights a tension between the industrial economy and financial 
system whereby returns on investment come to depend not only on consumption of commodities but on the 
perpetual expansion of revenue streams from financial investment. Indeed one form of ‘temporal fix’ is based on 
credit (see appendix). By creating present purchasing power on the promise on future repayment (with interest) 
the accumulation contradiction that arises in the M-C-M’ circuit when the level money is insufficient to purchase 
all the available commodities can be off-set. Of course once the level interest repayment equals the borrower’s 
income, this temporal fix becomes unsustainable. A parallel problem arises in relation to the M-M’ circuit, where 
the perpetual growth of capital investment is needed to sustain fictitious values (explicit/transactional reflexivity). 
Credit expansion can help ensure there is sufficient money in the system to allow surplus exchange value to be 
realised. However, this source of liquidity depends on the availability of bank credit which is shaped by risk 
calculations and expectations of future returns These expectations are influenced by endogenous market cycles  
and self-referential (and self-reinforcing) feedback loops within the financial circuit of accumulation.  
 
Importantly, Minsky’s (1977, 1982) analysis points out that periods of  financial market stability generate the 
conditions for future instability. A perceived investment opportunity (such as the development of new financial 
instruments promising attractive returns, e.g. CDOs) generates demand for credit from the investment sector. 
The ensuing investment fuels market activity and an expansion of fictitious financial market values. This growth 
encourages market optimism and minimises risk perception both among investors and bank creditors. 
Consequently, there is an expansion of low-interest credit due to high confidence in borrower’s ability to repay 
debt from future returns (which is partly attributable to the growing value of securities, which moreover, provide 
collateral for further loans). This allows a positive feedback loop to form, whereby financial market growth 
engenders euphoria among investors and banks, generating further cheap credit expansion on the expectation 
that further market growth will continue and ensure debts are repaid. The current returns constitute a signal 
confirming the validity of future expectation of further growth.  
 
Thus the risk of future defaults on loans is calculated on the basis of currently (over)optimistic perceptions of 
future market growth, shaped by the expansion of financial values in the recent past. Minksy (1977, 1982, 1992) 
                                                 
12
 Hyman Minksy’s Financial Instability Hypothesis was marginalised by mainstream economic theory, partly because it 
rejected a core premise of the dominant neoliberal/monetarist paradigm, namely the assumption that market instability and 
inefficiency stemmed primarily from exogenous attempts to interfere with market processes (such as government regulation). 
The applicability of his theories to recent crises has led to a posthumous interest in his work, however, it is interesting to note 
that Minsky’s ideas have long been recognised within elite investment circles, as evidenced by repeated references in top 
analyst newsletters and online forums (e.g. John Mauldin’s Outside the Box and Thoughts from the Frontline newsletters and 
blog). The fact that his work has often gone unacknowledged in media discourses, policy thinking and mainstream 
economics textbooks does not seem to have prevented its recognition in investment circles. Note also that Keen (2001) 
argues that while Minsky is often regarded as a neo-Keynesian, his analysis can be used to usefully extend Marx’s 
anticipation of capitalism’s intrinsic tendency toward crisis.  
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suggests that this entails two structural transitions in the quality of the credit-debt relations underpinning 
investment.  Initially, ‘hedge finance
13
‘ allows borrowers to fulfil all their payment obligations from current cash 
flows, so if the investments made with the borrowed capital did not produce the expected returns, the debts 
could still be repaid. However, as credit levels expand, the continued expansion of market values becomes 
underpinned by ‘speculative finance’, meaning that the interest on the debt used to fund investments can be 
covered by current cash flows, but the principle debt repayment must be deferred, pending as-yet-unrealised 
increases in investment earnings.  
 
Although this means that increases in interest rates or reductions in earnings may place the investor in a default 
scenario, continuation of the positive feedback loop may lead to investment becoming underpinned by ‘Ponzi 
finance
14
‘. This means that the repayment requirements on the borrowed capital can only be serviced if the 
investor can liquidate the assets in which they have invested the loan, or by borrowing even more money either 
to cover short-term interest obligations or invest in the hope of making quick returns (none of which are probable 
in a cycle of declining expectations, credit and liquidity). In other words, the symbolic creation of fictitious value 
ends up depending on a pyramid scheme of credit. Crucially, the points of inflection from hedge to speculative to 
Ponzi finance are not discernible during the expansionary phase of the credit cycle because continuing returns/ 
market price increases appear to confirm the validity of continued optimism and low risk estimates.  
 
As Perelman (1987) points out, the expansion of fictitious financial values is erroneously interpreted as an 
indicator of a robust economy. However, the increasing structural fragility of the underlying debt-finance 
eventually leads to crisis when, returns on investments fail to meet market expectations. Because asset prices 
already factor in price expectations and risk calculations, this triggers downward revisions of asset values which 
reduces the collateral holdings of borrowers. This leads the banking system to re-assess the risk of maintaining 
their loans to investors. Interest rates increase and creditors may require assets be liquidated to provide an 
increased collateral ‘margin’ or ‘haircut’ (see Thompson’s [2003] discussion of the LTCM meltdown).  This can 
shift hedge-financed investments into speculative or Ponzi forms.  
 
As Minsky (1977, 1982, 1992) suggests, the positive feedback cycle that generated the boom is now primed to 
reverse and turn negative.  A shock to market expectations such as a debt-default, a ratings downgrade, and 
interest rate hike, or weak returns in a growth sector leads to securities being sold, driving down their market 
values (see later discussion of pricing mechanisms), amplified by the panic of investors who find that their Ponzi-
type exposure means debts can only be serviced if securities are sold off. However, the required returns cannot 
be realised in a market panic where everyone is trying to sell. Defaults on loans accumulate, which not only 
reduce the expected returns and market value of the creditor institutions (which are themselves subject to 
shareholder expectations), they also implode the value of any assets based on the securitization of the debts 
(i.e. future revenue streams) they have created. As Dodd (1994) observes, ‘Economic expectations are formed 
on the basis of perceptions of stability and instability […] In this sense, expectations can on aggregate resemble 
something of a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the rational assessment of information plays an integral and 
constitutive role.’ (1994, p.132).  
 
Kindleberger (1996) points out that although financial crises can be manifested in different ways and their 
proximate triggers can vary, Minsky’s account of how market stability can lead to instability explains a wide 
range of financial phenomena. His framework is directly applicable to the recent credit crunch (see Whalen, 
2007), the dot-com bubble, and the SE Asian currency crises (see Saqib, 2001).  Moreover, its emphasis on 
endogenously-generated market signals also offers a way of extending Marx’s recognition of capitalism’s 
tendency towards accumulation crisis to contemporary financial markets. Although Minsky’s framework 
recognises that credit cycles and crises depend on institutional-level market perceptions and (mis)interpretations 
of key indicators, it does not explain the symbolic processes involved or the role financial media might play in 
such phenomena. This is precisely where a communication-oriented framework is helpful, not only in extending 
Minksy, but also in transcoding his analysis onto a (revised) Marxist framework that can take account of the 
                                                 
13
 Hedge finance in this context has nothing specific to do with hedge funds, except that it suggests risks/liabilities are evenly 
balanced by other investments/ revenue streams, i.e. current interest obligations. 
 
14
 Ponzi finance refers to a kind of pyramid scheme notoriously pioneered by Charles Ponzi in 1920. This involves investment 
in a fund whose earnings depend on cash-flows generated by selling more and more shares in the scheme. The South Sea 
bubble involved an early example of this kind of scam. More recently in 2008, former NASDAQ chairman Bernie Madoff was 
found to have operated the largest Ponzi scheme in history, scamming $65 billion from duped investors. However, as Minksy 
demonstrates, there are far larger Ponzi systems operated routinely in the financial markets.  
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informational reflexivity and the symbolic dimension of capital on the M-M’ circuit. These processes are central to 
both the ‘symbolic fix’ to the contradictions of accumulation and the development of financial crises and bubbles.  
 
 
 
 
The Credit Crunch  
 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US stemmed from the issuance of credit to borrowers who were at high risk 
of default, who had only the property they were purchasing as collateral.  As top US analyst, John Mauldin 
(2008) explains, the mortgages were then pooled and securitised into CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) to 
spread the risk of non-repayment evenly, and these were divided up into ‘tranches’, prioritising repayment for 
holders of the top tranches, while the bottom (and cheapest) tranches would incur the brunt of any losses. This 
allowed the higher-tranch securities to be awarded investment-grade accreditation from the ratings agencies. 
Meanwhile, the riskiest tranches were subject to a secondary round of pooling and securitisation, prioritising 
repayment for the top tranches and again rendering them eligible for investment-grade ratings and thus 
palatable to institutional investors. Thanks to this financial alchemy, nuclear waste became effectively 
transformed into what seemed like gold (Mauldin, 2008). Consequently, banks continued to issue credit and 
CDOs. Institutional investors, including the banks themselves (both in the US and overseas) took on billions of 
dollars’ worth of these securities. Not surprisingly,  when interest rates increased, defaults on the sub-prime 
mortgage debt began to accumulate, and as houses were repossessed by the banks (again in line with the 
Minskian model of crisis) the bubble in the housing market that had been driven by availability of the cheap 
credit began to deflate. The lower-tranch CDOs based on these mortgages began to lose money, but this was 
largely factored into their prices. As Mauldin (2008) points out, the discount on the investment grade assets 
based on the secondary securitisation (the nuclear waste) were sold at around 70% of their face value. In 
practice, this meant that the holders not only had relative priority for repayment, they could also suffer defaults of 
up to 30% before incurring any actual losses. Unfortunately, the ratings agencies’ systems of risk calculation 
were based not on the discounted market price but on the full ‘par’ price. Crucially, this meant that even minor 
losses relative to face value constituted default, and triggered immediate downgrading even though the CDOs 
were actually still generating returns.  
 
Many financial institutions are obliged to operate within quite rigid parameters of risk exposure. Common models 
include Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Mark-to-Market which require current portfolio values and potential losses to be 
indexed to current market prices. Moreover, many investment institutions are requires to off-load any asset with 
a credit-rating below a set threshold (usually BBB). Consequently, as viable securities were listed as junk-status, 
many institutional investors were obliged to sell them off, collapsing their price and evaporating the value of 
these assets. Increasing market uncertainty and volatility increased the perception of credit-risk, so margin calls 
and VaR adjustments exacerbated the trend. This meant that mark-to-market systems were signalling massive 
de-valuation of assets that were in many cases actually still generating profits in line with expectations; thus 
potentially robust ‘fundamentals’ could be performatively obscured by the very analytical systems and abstract 
metrics intended to facilitate accurate interpretation/evaluation. The complexity of the CDOs and their tranches 
meant that many financial institutions and analysts did not comprehend them well enough to assess the level of 
risk they represented (Maudlin, 2008). In effect, the fact that the financial community’s intersubjective 
codifications incorporated metrics such as VaR, mark-to-market calculations and ratings agency grades as 
criteria for trading decisions predisposed investors classify the entire class of CDO securities as either worthless 
or dangerously risky. Although there were some potentially lucrative CDO assets, in an environment where even 
AAA-grade securities could not be trusted not to become junk overnight, the prevailing intersubjective 
codifications provided no adequate frames to differentiate the ‘gold’ from the ‘nuclear waste’.   
 
The ensuing climate of mistrust and confusion over CDOs and the uncertainty over the validity of the key models 
and indicators as a guide to the risks entailed was a significant vector through which the sub-prime crisis 
translated into the global credit-crunch. Institutional risk control systems required investors holding the securities 
to offload securities rapidly losing value into an illiquid market that was no longer certain how to value them.  
This is confirmed by a candid statement from BNP Paribas, a European bank which had taken on significant 
CDO holdings in three funds it managed: ‘The complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of 
the US securitisation market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their quality or 
credit rating. The situation is such that it is no longer possible to value fairly the underlying US ABS assets […]. 
We are therefore unable to calculate a reliable net asset value (‘NAV’) for the funds’. (BNP Paribas, 2007, no 
page) 
 
 12 
Underpinning both the sub-prime crisis and the credit crunch was a break-down in the market models deployed 
to calculate financial values and risk. Once these ceased to produce coherent meanings among market actors, 
fictitious market values could not be sustained. Particularly in regard to the CDO credit ratings and the 
calculation financial risk, by a break-down in the coherence of the relation between key market indicators (such 
as credit risk ratings) and variations in monetary value, thereby rendering standard investment valuation models 
invalid. This might be regarded as a break-down of semantic symmetry among market actors; despite all the 
available information, there was no way to determine the validity of any frame that would allow investors to be 
sure what it all meant. This nevertheless led to important symmetries of agency, because as the potential 
responses of other market actors became increasingly uncertain, risk aversion developed, with the result that 
everyone wanted to off-load potentially toxic securities and nobody wanted to extend credit when there was no 
way to be sure that any borrower would not be the next to collapse and default.  Essentially, then, financial 
crises can be linked to a break-down in the intersubjective codifications that underpin the meaning of financial 
signals and actions. The annihilation of value that occurs in a crisis can be understood as a semiotic rupture in 
commensuration between the symbols denoting future monetary values inscribed into securities so as to frame 
them as present values, and the monetary values currently being realised when those securities are liquidated 
(i.e. that capital accumulation in the M-M’ circuit is failing such that the expectation that M’ > M becomes M’ < M). 
This semiotic incommensuration breaks down the intersubjective codifications and matrices of shared meaning 
needed to sustain the validity of fictitious values, crystallising the contradiction in the relation of capital 
accumulation.  
 
 
Financial Autopoiesis  
 
The concept of autopoiesis has been adapted from its biological origins (Maturana & Varela, 1980) by several 
social theorists to help explain processes in self-reproducing social systems. Jessop’s (2001a, 2001b) approach 
was informative here, particularly in regard to accumulation regimes, although several recent adaptations of 
Luhmann’s (1995) work were also considered. Hessling  & Pahl (2006) suggest that self-reference and positive 
feedback loops in the financial system’s operations, evidenced by markets responding to signals generated in/by 
the financial markets themselves would confirm this autopoietic tendency. Hernes & Bakken (2003), meanwhile, 
usefully suggest the need for a theory of social action based on reflexive/recursive processes in order to account 
for social autopoiesis. Graham (2006) duly outlines such an approach and identifies the importance of 
communicative reflexivity in financial markets, suggesting that language and media discourses both demarcate 
system boundaries and help extend the system logics of accumulation into other social systems. Leydesdorff 
(2007) similarly notes that shared epistemologies/codifications constitutively demarcate the boundaries of social 
systems and points to the potential for communicative processes to extend these across system boundaries. 
 
A key distinction is drawn here between embeddedness in the sense of systemic interdependence (such as the 
state-based governance regimes underpinning global financial activity) and autopoiesis in the sense of the 
asymmetrical/ non-reciprocal extension of one subsystem’s codifications into those of another such that events 
and signals demarcated as meaningful/significant in the former  become codified so as to become significant in 
the latter. Thus for example, because financial markets pay attention to credit ratings and have thresholds below 
which major market actors will be institutionally obliged to offload securities, governments become sensitised to 
these ratings, even modifying social policy to avoid negative repercussions for their bond-issues and currency 
stability (Kunzcik, 2002, Soederberg, 2002). Financial markets nevertheless depend in part on state-based 
systems of governance for their operations (even when these are supranational in scope), so they remain 
embedded in important respects. Although global networks of finance will certainly respond to events and 
actions by governments, the relation is not a reciprocal one. The spatial-temporal configurations of financial 
markets and the transborder mobility of capital means that any unilateral effort by a government to regulate 
financial trading or restrict accumulation can usually be circumvented. Meanwhile, any non-financial negative 
repercussions for the state, industrial economy or lifeworld incurred by accommodating accumulation 
imperatives are typically coded as externalities irrelevant to trading frames/schemata (in system theory terms, 
this does not count as negative feedback for the financial subsystem).  
 
In this regard, communicative/informational reflexivity can be considered indexical of an autopoietic tendency 
within the financial markets. The self-referentiality of the relation between financial information and financial 
market activity has been noted by several authors including Stalder (2001), Knorr-Cetina (2005) and Graham 
(2006). Hessling & Pahl (2006) note that financial trading practices presuppose a highly specialised microculture 
(consistent with Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2002,), pointing put that investors are sensitive to the price signals 
that trading activity generates and that the models assumed in guiding trading may have a performative/ self-
fulfilling influence. Other research into the effects of financial media on investors (Sant & Zaman, 2006; Busse & 
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Green, 2002; also see Davis, 2005) does suggest they can be influential where there is an anticipation of an 
announcement or influential commentator liable to move the market.   
 
The empirical research that has informed this paper was intended to examine the evidence of reflexivity in 
investors’ media/ information usage
15
. One general finding was the very limited evidence of any correlation 
between the perceived importance of media/sources and their perceived objectivity (where these were 
significant, they were only weak: <0.3). This suggested that what made an information source valuable to trading 
decisions was generally not related to whether it was considered to be providing factual, accurate information. 
The study also identified a distinction between two broad categories of media; Public Media (consisting of 
regular print, broadcast and online news media and other publicly accessible media sources) were generally 
regarded as less important than Institutional Media (consisting of high-end financial information services, private 
analyst reports and networks of professional contacts). Meanwhile two broad categories of information were 
identified: Market Information (consisting of fundamental and technical data) was regarded as marginally more 
important than Reflexive Information (comprising of factors such as market mood, rumours, and other market 
actors’ opinions). Moderate significant correlations were identified between the importance ascribed to Public 
Media and Market Information and between Institutional Media and Reflexive Information. There was no 
correlation between the importance ascribed to Public media and Reflexive Information or between Institutional 
Media and Market Information. This is interesting because it suggests that any trading advantage conferred by 
profession financial information systems was not primarily derived from providing market facts and figures 
(although observation and interviews showed real-time pricing information was constantly monitored on the wire 
services and electronic brokerage systems). This can be explained by the recognition within the professional 
investment community that all the basic market data is symmetrically distributed, so any trading advantage 
stems more from discerning which data is currently most salient and spotting emerging trends ahead of rivals. 
This kind of meta-information is accessed through institutional networks and helps traders discern the 
investment frames/schemata currently driving price movements and the positions/trading activity of other 
investment institutions that are liable to move the market. use of institutional networks allows privileged access 
to professional analysts’ views and unofficial ‘whisper numbers’, detection of market flows, identification of shifts 
in market drivers and validation of prevailing trading frames. This also underlines the difficulty of identifying 
independent variables and indeed,  indicates that investment models and fundamentals themselves evolve over 
time depending on the prevailing codifications (see also Beunza & Garud, 2005; Knorr-Cetina & Preda 2007). In 
line with Minksy’s FIH, the findings would suggest that  the monitoring of other actors will tend to increase during 
periods of instability or at times where shifts in a market cycle are anticipated. Where this leads to a shift in focus 
from Market Information to Reflexive Information there is potential for self-referential feedback loops to form, and 
it is here that financial media may play a role in amplifying feedback loops.  
 
However, this should not be interpreted as confirmation that investors are in a perpetual state of irrational 
herding or as confirmation of a radical autopoiesis whereby financial market become completely self-referential 
and respond only to endogenous noise generated within the financial markets themselves. Market information, 
including core fundamentals such as company earnings, interest rates, GDP, and inflation remains central to 
most investment models and several interviewee respondents who readily acknowledged the potential for 
informational reflexivity also suggested that prices over the long term would tend to converge toward an 
equilibrium around fundamentals. Although fundamentals may undergo transitory shifts in priority,  some core 
variables do not appear to disappear from trading frames, and most have external referents in the industrial 
economy and polity. This would seem to anchor (however imprecisely) the intersubjective codifications 
underpinning the financial system to events and conditions in other subsystems.  
 
The financial system’s periodic tendency towards over-expansion of unsustainable fictitious values and 
subsequent collapse suggests that (in line with Minksy, 1977, 1982) there are shifts between the intersubjective 
codifications driving trading and prices during stable periods and those driving prices when markets become 
volatile and generate bubbles or crashes. The positive feedback of prices during growth periods feeds back into 
credit risk calculations and expectations of further growth, leading investment decisions to be based increasingly 
on the endogenous signals investors themselves have generated. The financial media do not cause these 
cycles, but as Davis (2005) suggests, they can help to amplify consensus opinion, and during periods of 
instability, this may increase the propensity for herding and self-fulfilling prophecy. If the intersubjective 
coherence and validity of the models/schemata emphasising fundamentals break down, valuations become 
dependent on self-referential opinion from key opinion leaders and signals such as price momentum. This would 
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 The quantitative survey generated this data using semantic differential scales which were then analysed using SPSS, but 
these were supplemented by interviews and periods of observation of trading floors. 
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suggest that financial autopoiesis is itself cyclical in nature and ontologically inseparable from informational 
reflexivity.  
 
Although the primary causes of periodic financial instability and crises are endogenously generated, their 
consequences are not restricted to endogenous implosions of fictitious value on balance sheets. The exogenous 
impacts may include capital flight, currency devaluations, pension fund losses, corporate bankruptcies, defaults 
on sovereign bonds, home repossessions, unemployment and increasing hardship in the lifeworld.  Financial 
crises are not subject to any form of civic accountability and the citizens whose lives are ruined in the wake of 
such events have no recourse to compensation or legal protection. On the contrary, they will often end up 
footing the bill for restoring financial instability. The securitization of risk through new financial instruments has 
increasingly resulted in an transfers of financial liability from markets onto the polity and lifeworld.  
 
Indeed, as the unfolding credit crunch indicates, when banks stop lending to each other, the cash-flows to the 
entire economy are affected. The banking sector has called upon state/taxpayer support to stabilise both the 
banks and the entire financial system by injecting liquidity into the market. The trillions of dollars invested by 
governments in Europe and North America to bail out the banking sector and revive credit creation are funded 
largely by the issuance of government bonds payable to the very banking system being rescued. No sooner had 
bail-out packages been negotiated than the financial markets began to exert pressure on the benefactor 
governments to reduce their debt levels by cutting spending on public services. Failure to do so will doubtless 
result in financial trading driving up interest rates and destabilising currencies. Thus the banking sector is not 
only being bailed out by the taxpayer, the public debt incurred by the bond issue is also payable to the banking 
and finance institutions which bought the government bonds used to fund the bail-out.  
 
As Thompson (2009) has noted, the media’s response to the credit crunch was somewhat ambivalent, exhibiting 
both criticism of financial irrationality and fat-cat bankers’ bonuses and criticism of governments either for failing 
to prevent the crisis or not doing enough to remedy it. However, there has been relatively little attention paid to 
the more fundamental problems of the private credit-based monetary system. As Josiah Stamp, director of the 
Bank of England at the time of the Wall Street crash wryly observed: 
 
‘The modern banking system manufactures money out of nothing. The process is perhaps the most 
astounding piece of slight of hand that was ever invented. Banking was conceived in iniquity and 
born in sin. Bankers own the earth; take it away from them but leave them with the power to create 
credit, and with the stroke of a pen they will create enough money to buy it back again […] If you 
want to be slaves of the bankers and pay the costs of your own slavery, then let the bankers create 
money’ (Stamp, quoted in Rowbotham, 1998, p.36). 
 
 
Concluding Observations 
 
Although this discussion has been necessarily abbreviated in places, and there is scope for far more detail and 
refinement, the overview provided identifies several potentially useful angles of analysis a communication-based 
framework emphasising intersubjective codifications and reflexivity can bring to the analysis of contemporary 
financial phenomena. These include-  
 Highlighting the constructed nature of market fundamentals and the performative aspects of the trading 
models/frames (and thus risk calculations and market expectations),  
 Providing a fuller account of the constitutive symbolic ontology of monetary forms, financial transactions and 
fictitious value creation on the M-M’ circuit.  
 Extending a neo-Marxist political economy account of accumulation contradictions  and spatial-temporal 
fixes with a socio-cultural account of fictitious value and the potential for a ‘symbolic fix’.   
 Integrating Minsky’s account of financial market endogenous tendency toward crisis to communicative 
processes implicit in the endogenous feedback loops that generate bubbles and crisis 
 Conceptualising the boundaries of social systems in terms of intersubjective codification and the financial 
systems’ autopoietic propensity to communicative reflexivity.  
 Suggesting a potential avenue for the integrating of political economic and cultural economic insights. 
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Appendix: Typologies of Accumulation ‘Fix’ and Related Role of Media/ 
Communication 
 
Mode of 
Accumulation 
Fix 
Functions and  
Institutional Forms 
Role of media/ information/ 
communication processes 
 
 
Spatial- global 
extension 
(imperialism/ 
dispossession) 
 Generation of surplus value on M-
C-M’ circuit. 
 State backed-imperialism 
(sometimes military) in collusion 
with public joint-stock corporations.  
 Transnational corporations with 
operations dispersed globally. 
 Sourcing of cheap overseas labour 
and resources 
 Avoidance of domestic taxation 
through 
 Cultivation of new export markets to 
absorb surplus production. 
 Supranational trade forums broker 
removal of domestic trade barriers. 
 Coordination/ control of international 
operations by state and capital. 
 Media promotion of investment 
opportunities to the public as well as 
private investors. 
 Communication of commodity prices 
across different national markets, 
(especially after development of 
telegraph). 
 Cultivation of consumer demand through 
market research and advertising. 
 Promotion of free market norms of 
economic growth (and national 
development in emerging markets). 
 
 
 
Spatial- 
colonisation of 
state sector/ 
public services 
(dispossession) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Extend generation of surplus value 
on M-C-M’ circuit. 
 State adoption of monetarist 
policies and privatisation of public 
assets/state services. 
 Break-up of state sector 
monopolies and opening up of 
markets to competition (e.g. 
telecommunications). 
 Reduction of welfare provisions to 
decrease state spending and drive 
down wage demands/ maintain 
unemployment levels/ decrease 
inflation. 
 Private corporations extending or 
diversifying holdings into public 
services. 
 Establishment of  international 
governance regimes (e.g. IMF 
SAPs) require removal of domestic 
trade barriers and opening up of 
markets to private competition. 
 Legitimation of monetarist policies 
through policy discourses in public media 
and economic publications. 
 Legitimation of neoliberal norms 
concerning personal financial 
responsibility and private pensions.  
 Legitimation of private/ foreign investment 
as being in the public interest. 
 Selective media (mis)representation of 
economic issues in developing/ emerging 
markets (including Russia and SE Asia).  
 Promotion of new investment 
opportunities in public services. 
 Coordination of foreign investments for 
TNCs buying up state assets overseas. 
 
Spatial-
Symbolic: 
cultural 
colonisation 
(cultural 
dispossession) 
 Extend generation of surplus value 
on M-C-M’ circuit. 
 Extension of TNC operations 
including media corporations. 
 Mass production of consumer 
goods marketed globally. 
 Co-option of forms of cultural 
expression/ identification and 
transformation into commodity 
forms.  
 Normalisation of commodity fetishism and 
consumerist identities through public 
media. 
 Commercial advertising for specific 
brands and commodities to generate 
artificial demand for products and 
services. 
 Fetishisation of brands with sign value 
that have minimal connection to 
productive economy (e.g. Nike) 
 
Spatial-
Temporal-  
long-term FDI 
 
 Extend generation of surplus value 
on M-C-M’ circuit. 
 Extension of TNC and Finance 
investment into long-term capital 
projects, especially infrastructure 
 Coordination/ control of international 
operations by state and capital. 
 Media promotion of investment 
opportunities to the public as well as 
private investors. 
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Spatial-
Temporal-  
long-term FDI 
 
development in emerging 
economies. 
 Establishment of international trade 
and financial governance regimes 
to open up markets to 
private/foreign investment. 
 
 
Temporal- 
productive 
efficiency 
 Extend/accelerate generation of 
surplus value on M-C-M’ circuit. 
 Use of industrial/ information 
technology to increase productivity, 
reduce wastage, and increase 
logistical efficiency. 
 Information technology/ computing used 
to coordinate TNC activity and operate 
just-in-time systems.  
 Use of IT for real-time market information 
and investment efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Temporal- 
credit 
extension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Create money through the issuance 
of credit/debt and financial assets 
through the securitization of that 
debt.  
 Generate surplus value on  M-M’ 
circuit (interest). 
 Use of debt as leverage to impose 
market liberalisation on emerging 
economies. 
 Extend generation of surplus value 
on M-C-M’ circuit. 
 Increase  rate of retail consumption 
through borrowing to accelerate 
accumulation. 
 Increase business investment and 
economic growth by encouraging 
borrowing to support business 
ventures, including borrowing for 
financial speculation. 
 Deregulation of banking/ credit 
sector allows convergence of 
commercial and investment banking 
and formation of shadow banking 
system. 
  
 Shift to symbolic monetary forms with 
values inscribed in market confidence not 
material commodity value (e.g. gold). 
 IT and computing facilitate new electronic 
forms of money/ payment and paperless 
credit systems. 
 Cultivation of consumer demand through 
advertising and promotion of commodity 
fetishism. 
 Cultivation of neoliberal norms in regard 
to credit/debt and demand for major 
borrowing to fund mortgages. 
 Maintenance of confident investment 
climate through media reports (NB: the 
media may also play a role in reversing 
that confidence) 
 
 
 
Symbolic- 
fictitious values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Generation of financial values on 
M-M’ circuit. 
 Deregulation of capital flows and 
‘big bang’ wiring up of financial 
exchanges promote growth of 
finance in relation to GDP.  
 New financial architecture and 
governance regimes oblige 
transparency/ disclosure to 
increase market efficiency. 
 Creation of economic value to 
sustain accumulation through the 
securitisation of revenue streams 
from companies stocks), credit/debt 
(bonds and interest rate securities) 
and currency speculation. 
 imposition of market discipline on 
industrial economy and state 
through free capital flows and  price 
responsiveness to earnings, debt 
and policy. 
 Symbolic generation of fictitious values 
through coordination of meanings 
ascribed  to economic actions based on 
specific intersubjective codifications that 
permit financial symbols to become 
constitutive of value.  
 NCTs provide real-time market 
information systems and facilitate 
interlinked exchanges to create a global 
financial market. 
 Provision of electronic platforms for global 
trading activity. 
 Governance regimes emphasising 
transparency increase symmetry of 
market information. 
 Financial media provide the key interface 
between traders, analysts and reporters 
and permit intensification of market 
surveillance/monitoring. 
 Financial media also facilitate symmetries 
of information across markets and may at 
times engender reflexive/ self-referential 
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Symbolic- 
fictitious values 
feedback loops which allows market 
bubbles to be sustained (but can 
potentially lead to crisis). 
 Media discourses legitimate and valorise 
financial markets as a key driver of the 
new economy. 
 Financial media also disseminate and 
legitimate prevailing theories/ models/ 
schemata which are then performatively 
manifested through trading practices.  
 Financial advertising and NCTs, along 
with increased financial content of public 
media promote expansion of financial 
participation to non-institutional investors. 
 
Symbolic-
Temporal- 
fictitious values 
through new 
forms of 
securitisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Extend generation of financial 
values on M-M’ circuit  
 Development of NFIs through the 
securitisation of future 
contingencies in revenue streams 
and price movements in other 
securities (derivatives). 
 Securitisation and transfer of risk 
exposure allowing hedging 
practices and closure of price 
spreads, reducing arbitrage 
opportunities (derivatives) 
 Intensification of market discipline 
and efficiency through enabling 
commensuration across different 
capital forms.  
 Amplification of financial earnings 
through leveraged trading using 
derivatives to take advantage of 
narrower spreads/ arbitrage 
opportunities.  
 Intensification of M-M’ temporal 
cycles upon other forms of capital. 
 As above (with less non-institutional 
investor participation), plus: 
 NCTs combined with financial theory 
produce new modes of trading and 
complex NFIs. 
 Performative aspect of NFIs and financial 
calculation practices manifests 
commensuration across different 
securities based on intersubjective 
codifications providing common notations 
for risk. 
 Performative binding of future price 
expectations to current valuations. 
 Commensuration of different securities 
and interlinkage of market agency across 
different portfolios reconfigures relations 
among different securities, creating non-
natural (non-) correlations in price 
movements.  
 NFIs circumvent regulatory regimes 
especially in regard to disclosure/ 
transparency.  
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